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Abstract
A growing body of evidence suggests that people exhibit large biases when
processing information about themselves, but less is known about the under-
lying inference process. This paper studies belief updating patterns regarding
academic ability in a large sample of students transitioning from middle to high
school in Mexico City. The analysis takes advantage of rich and longitudinal data
on subjective beliefs together with randomized feedback about individual perfor-
mance on an achievement test. On average, the performance feedback reduces
the relative role of priors on posteriors and shifts substantial probability mass
toward the signal. Further evidence reveals that males and high-socioeconomic
status students tend to process new information on their own ability more effec-
tively.
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1 Introduction
Recent work on social psychology suggests that self-assessments of individual traits
are often flawed in substantive and systematic ways. For instance, it is often argued
that people tend to hold rather favorable views of their abilities - both in absolute and
relative terms [Moore and Healy, 2008; Dunning et al., 2004].
Upwardly biased self-views may have important economic consequences. Some
studies, for example, show that managers tend to have more faith in their firms than
is warranted [Daniel et al., 1998; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008]. When individ-
uals invest in human capital early in life, biased beliefs about academic skills may
be related to mistakes and mismatches in schooling choices that are hard to reverse,
with potentially long-lasting consequences for labor market outcomes. A recent strand
of the economics of education literature has identified important updating effects on
beliefs and choices due to the provision of information about individual academic per-
formance.1 Much less is known on the different pathways through which exposure to
informative achievement signals may correct biased priors among youth on the verge
of important schooling decisions.
This paper aims at partly filling this gap by taking advantage of longitudinal data on
students’ beliefs about their own academic ability and exogenous variation in exposure
to individualized performance feedback. We first document the level of pass-through
of the ability signal and the degree of persistence of priors in the distribution of pos-
terior beliefs. Next, we dissect the updating process by proposing an updating model
that flexibly explores the relationship between individual priors and posteriors. The
model estimates shed light on the channels through which different individuals process
information about their own ability.
The evidence is drawn from a field experiment embedded in the context of the
centralized assignment mechanism that allocates students into public high schools in
the metropolitan area of Mexico City. We design a mock version of the admission
exam that we give to a large sample of potential applicants and reveal individual
1Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner [2012, 2014] document substantial updating effects on beliefs
and major outcomes for college students. Azmat and Iriberri [2010]; Elsner and Isphording [2017];
Azmat et al. [2019] study the role of students’ ordinal rank and feedback about relative performance
on study effort and academic performance. Bergman [2015] and Dizon-Ross [2019] focus instead
on whether and how information asymmetries between parents and their children affect schooling
investments. In a companion paper [Bobba and Frisancho, 2019], we show that providing students with
information about their own ability changes school choices and assignment patterns across schools,
thereby reducing high-school drop-out.
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scores to a randomly chosen subset of test takers. We elicit repeated probabilistic
statements about performance beliefs in the actual admission test over a discretized
support to generate longitudinal measures of subjective expectations that are tightly
linked to immediate and high-stakes schooling decisions. Baseline data collected before
administering the mock test reveal that there are large discrepancies between students’
prior expectations and their actual test scores, with relatively more upwardly biased
and more uncertain beliefs among low-performing students.
We first estimate the average changes in the individual distribution of beliefs about
academic achievement across students with and without access to the feedback on indi-
vidual performance in the mock test. The feedback halves the relative role of priors on
posteriors and increases the probability mass in the interval containing the signal by 17
percentage points. We further show that high-performing students exhibit higher sig-
nal pass-through than their lower-performing counterparts, while higher-socioeconomic
(SES) students have relatively less persistent priors when compared to lower-SES stu-
dents. Overall, these updating patterns may mask some changes along the individual
distribution of beliefs that are difficult to capture in a simple reduced-form empirical
framework.
We thus propose and estimate an updating model that allows us to detect more
nuanced patterns of updating behavior. In this framework, probabilistic weights char-
acterize the mapping between priors and posteriors in each interval of the support of
the elicited belief distributions. These conditional probabilities can be estimated us-
ing the longitudinal variation in beliefs before and after the provision of performance
feedback to the students in the treatment group. Estimation results confirm that the
performance feedback represents an informative signal that spurs changes in the prob-
ability mass allocated to each interval of the prior densities. However, the results also
point to a limited effect of the signal due to the relatively strong persistence of pri-
ors. The estimates reveal systematic differences in updating behaviors along the test
score distribution, especially around the two tails. For instance, students who get the
lowest-valued signals only partly incorporate them into their posteriors, whereas those
who get the highest-valued signals still allocate some density to the lowest interval
of the prior distribution. Further sub-group analysis reveals that socio-demographic
characteristics are related to how students behave when processing new information
about their own academic ability. Males and higher-SES students experience signal
pass-through to a greater extent (i.e., they allocate a greater transition weight to the
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interval that contains the signal) and, overall, they tend to exhibit the most effective
updating patterns when compared to other sub-groups of students.
Earlier studies document updating patterns that are more or less consistent with
the Bayes rule [El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Zafar, 2011]. However, recent advances
in behavioral economics confirm that agents systematically depart from the Bayesian
updating benchmark [Benjamin, 2019; Fuster et al., 2019]. In particular, Wiswall and
Zafar [2015] document evidence on asymmetric updating in beliefs about earnings: self-
beliefs seem to be more responsive to information when priors are below beliefs about
population earnings.
Experimental evidence reveals that individuals exhibit particularly large biases
when processing new information and forming perceptions about personal traits and
skills. For instance, Eil and Rao [2011] use the quadratic scoring rule to repeatedly
elicit beliefs about intelligence and beauty and find that agents’ posteriors are less pre-
dictable and less sensitive to signal strength after receiving negative feedback. Burks
et al. [2013] obtain an alternative test by combining cross-sectional data on beliefs
and actual ability measures among truck drivers and also reject the null of Bayesian
updating. In the context of an online experiment about relative performance on an IQ
test, Mobius et al. [2011] find evidence of asymmetric updating and over-weighting of
positive signals.
A number of papers have proposed various models of non-Bayesian inference that
depart more or less radically from Bayes rule. For example, Rabin and Schrag [1999];
Compte and Postlewaite [2004]; Koszegi [2006] slightly modify Bayes’ rule by allowing
decision-makers to discard negative feedback about themselves. Such parsimonious
models preserve much of the predictive power of Bayesian updating but might be too
ad hoc and restrictive to explain systematic deviations from Bayesian inference. At the
other extreme, Akerlof and Dickens [1982]; Brunnermeier and Parker [2005]; Benabou
and Tirole [2002] allow agents to optimally choose subjective beliefs. While these
models can help explain some of the patterns in the data, it is hard to imagine a single
framework that governs the widely heterogenous patterns of updating behavior across
different individuals.
Our work also departs from the Bayesian benchmark as we flexibly estimate the
updating parameters that govern changes in individual belief distributions about own
ability after exposure to an informative signal. The results of this study may inform
the design of policy interventions aimed at disseminating information in education
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markets. In particular, our estimates provide direct evidence on whether and how the
patterns of belief updating systematically vary depending on individual traits such as
academic ability, gender, and SES. These heterogeneous effects point towards the need
of complementary strategies of information provision that may potentially enhance the
degree of signal extraction among certain sub-groups.
2 The Feedback Provision Experiment
2.1 Context and Experimental Design
Access to public schools at the upper-secondary level in Mexico City is regulated by a
centralized assignment mechanism known as the COMIPEMS admission system (by its
Spanish acronym). In 2014, the year in which the experiment and the data collection
took place, over 238,000 students were placed in the 628 participating public high
schools. Overall, the assignment system accounts for roughly three-quarters of high
school enrollment within the metropolitan area.
The application process starts by the end of the last year of middle school. Ninth
graders receive all relevant information about the process through a booklet containing
important dates and detailed instructions of the application process as well as infor-
mation about the available high school programs, including the curricular track or
modality (general, technical, or vocational) and the corresponding cut-off scores for
the past three years. To participate in the admission process, students submit a reg-
istration form and a socio-demographic survey, as well as a rank-ordered list of up to
20 preferred schools early in the calendar year. Placement in a given school is solely
determined by students’ submitted choices and their scores in a single standardized
achievement exam, which takes place in July, after registration and towards the end of
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the school year.2 The timing of the events throughout the admission process implies
that the submitted school rankings – which partly determine the observed sorting pat-
terns across schools – are sensitive to students’ subjective expectations of their own
performance in the admission exam.
We design and implement a field experiment that provides students with individ-
ualized feedback on their academic skills during their transition from middle to high
school. We administer a mock version of the admission test, communicate individual
scores to the treatment group, and elicit probabilistic statements about performance
beliefs in the admission test. In this setting, the score in the mock exam provides
students with a signal about their own academic skills.
Among the universe of public middle schools in the Mexico City metropolitan area,
we focus on those located in neighborhoods with high or very high poverty levels, since
the students therein are less likely to be exposed to previous signals about their individ-
ual performance in the admission exam.3 We further restrict the sample to schools with
a large mass of potential applicants to the school assignment mechanism as measured
by their relative contribution to the pool of applicants in the year 2012. Even though
we focus on less advantaged students, Table 1 shows that our final sample is largely
comparable to the general population of applicants in terms of basic socio-demographic
characteristics, initial academic credentials (GPA in middle school), preparation and
support through the assignment mechanism, and personality traits.
The final sample is comprised of 90 schools distributed across 12 strata, which are
defined by four geographic regions and terciles of school average performance among
2A deferred-acceptance matching algorithm (see, e.g., Pathak [2011]) with priorities defined by the
individual scores in the admission exam is used to assign students to their most preferred schooling
option with available seats. Whenever ties occur, participating institutions agree on whether admitting
all tied students or none of them. Applicants who are not placed by the algorithm can request
admission to schools with available seats in a second round of the assignment process or search
for a seat in private schools or public schools with open admissions outside the system. Whenever
applicants are not satisfied with their placement, they can request admission to another school in
the same way unassigned applicants do. All in all, the matching algorithm discourages applicants
to remain unplaced and/or list schools they will ultimately not enroll in. About 10 percent of the
students in our sample do not apply for the COMIPEMS assignment mechanism. Among those who
participate in the admission system, 11 percent remain unplaced and only 2 percent are admitted
through the second round of the matching process.
3Recent evidence from the United States documents that less privileged students tend to be
relatively more misinformed when making educational choices [Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Avery
and Hoxby, 2012]. Administrative data from the 2012 edition of the assignment system shows that, on
average, 33 percent of applicants took a preparatory course before submitting their schooling choices.
This share ranges from 44 to 12 percent across schools in neighborhoods with low and high levels of
poverty, respectively.
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ninth-graders in a national standardized achievement test (ENLACE, 2012). We ran-
domly pick one ninth-grade classroom in each sampled school to participate in the
experiment. Treatment assignment is randomized within strata at the school level.
As a result, 44 schools are assigned to a treatment group in which we administer the
mock exam and provide face-to-face feedback on performance (see Section 2.2), while
46 schools are assigned to a control group in which we only administer the mock exam,
without providing information about the test results.
2.2 Beliefs Elicitation and Data
Beliefs are measured in two survey rounds, both before and after the application of
the mock test. The mock test was administered a few days after the baseline survey
and the score obtained was provided to the treatment group during the follow-up
survey, which took place a few weeks before the beginning of the registration period
for the school assignment process. Beliefs among students in the treatment group
are collected twice during the follow-up survey, both before and after the delivery
of the performance feedback. To accurately measure probabilistic statements about
individuals’ achievement in the test, the elicitation process in both survey rounds
relied on visual aids [Delavande et al., 2011]. We explicitly linked the number of
beans placed in a cup to a probability measure, where zero beans correspond to a
zero probability event and 20 beans indicate that the student believes the event will
occur with certainty. The survey question eliciting beliefs reads as follows (authors’
translation from Spanish):
“Suppose that you were to take the COMIPEMS exam today, which has a
maximum possible score of 128 and a minimum possible score of zero. How
sure are you that your score would be between ... and ...”
When asking this question, surveyors provided students with a card divided into
six discrete intervals of the score and then asked them to allocate the 20 beans across
the intervals so as to represent their perceived chances of scoring in each bin. When
delivering the individual scores in the mock exam, surveyors showed a personalized
graph with two pre-printed bars: the average score in the universe of applicants during
the 2013 edition of the school assignment mechanism and the classroom-average score
in the mock test. During the interview, a third bar was plotted corresponding to
the student’s individual score in the mock test. The surveyors’ interactions with the
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students were always private, without the interference or presence of other students
or school staff. This minimizes issues related to social image concerns when reporting
subjective beliefs [Ewers and Zimmermann, 2015; Burks et al., 2013].
The mock test that we use to measure academic achievement was designed by the
institution in charge of the official test in order to mimic its structure, content, level of
difficulty, and duration (three hours). The test comprises 128 multiple-choice questions
worth one point each, without negative marking, covering a wide range of subjects
that correspond to the public middle school curriculum (Spanish, mathematics, social
sciences and natural sciences) as well as mathematical and verbal aptitude sections.4
The linear correlation in our sample between performance in the mock exam and the
actual exam is 0.82. In turn, the linear correlation between a freely available (but
possibly noisier) measure of ability such as middle school GPA and the score in the mock
test is 0.45. The mock test score is also a strong predictor of high-school outcomes,
such as GPA and graduation on time, even after controlling for GPA in middle school
[Bobba and Frisancho, 2019].
We interviewed 3,001 students in the baseline survey, and 93 percent of them took
the mock test. The number of students surveyed in the follow-up survey was 2,839. In
order to document updating patterns we need complete data on prior beliefs, signals,
and posterior beliefs and hence we drop students with incomplete survey records, which
yields a final sample of 2,544 students. Since the provision of performance feedback
took place during the follow-up survey, there is no differential attrition by treatment
assignment (P-value = 0.549).
The survey data are complemented with individual-level administrative records
from both the registration form and the assignment process in itself, which allow us to
observe admission exam scores, cumulative GPAs in middle school, socio-demographic
information, and other individual characteristics such as personality traits and study
habits. About 10 percent of the students in our final survey sample do not apply to
the COMIPEMS system and thus do not fill the registration form. With the exception
of households’ socioeconomic status (SES), all the other relevant variables used in the
4Thirteen questions related to the curriculum material that had not been covered by the time the
mock test was administered were not graded. Before providing feedback about individual performance
in the test, we normalize raw scores in the 115 valid questions to correspond to the 128-point scale.
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empirical analysis come from survey records.5
Table 2 provides basic descriptive statistics and shows that the clustered-block
randomization design we implemented was successful in achieving balance between the
treatment and control samples along a variety of individual characteristics as well as
household socio-demographic variables.
2.3 Descriptive Evidence on Beliefs
The elicited distributions of beliefs about test performance seem well-behaved. Using
the 20 observations (i.e., beans) per student, a normality test [Shapiro and Wilk, 1965]
is rejected for only 11 percent of the individual baseline distributions in the sample. As
few as 6 percent of the respondents place all the beans in one interval of the grid, which
suggests that the chosen discretization of the support of the admission exam is not too
coarse for the vast majority of the applicants in our sample. Still, there are relatively
fewer observations in the upper tail of the score distribution, in line with average mock
and admission exam scores around 59 and 65 points out of 128, respectively. Thus,
throughout the analysis, we merge the last two intervals into one (85-128).
Figure 1 reports the average frequencies of the prior distributions (i.e., beliefs before
giving the mock test) conditional on the score in the mock test. While there seems to
be quite a lot of dispersion in the priors for each discrete interval of the score, there is a
clear shift in the probability mass towards higher-valued intervals as the score increases.
This visual pattern indicates some degree of accuracy in the subjective expectations
elicited in the survey, especially among higher-performing students. Among those with
lower scores in the mock test, the probability mass allocated to each interval is slightly
increasing (rather than decreasing) along the support of the score.
Students seem to be quite uncertain about their own academic skills, as a large share
of them allocate positive density mass to intervals far away from their actual score in
the mock test. For each interval of the score, Figure 2 plots the share of students that
place at least one bean in each interval of the support of beliefs. At baseline, over a
third of the students who later score in the highest interval assign positive probability
5Table A.1 in the Web Appendix checks the share of missing records for SES by treatment status
and tests the differences across them. The estimates reported in Column 1 show that 21 percent of
students in the control group have no records on SES, and this share is not affected by the exposure
to performance feedback. Column 2 documents that after conditioning on those who apply to the
COMIPEMS system the share of missing records falls to 13, and it still does not differ across treatment
status.
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to the event that they could score in the lowest score interval. A similar but even
stronger pattern emerges among the lowest scorers: while 60% of them believe that
they could indeed score between 0 and 40, almost 70% of them assign some density
mass to the highest score interval. Thus, the variance of beliefs is decreasing in the
mock exam score.
Figure 1 also points out that overconfidence in prior beliefs is ubiquitous in the
sample. Irrespectively of the value of the score, students tend to assign the largest
probability mass to the highest interval of the score. Figure 3 provides an alternative
way to characterize the degree of overconfidence in our sample by plotting the relative
share of students who would receive “good” or “bad” news depending on whether or not
the score in the mock test belongs to an interval that is above the one corresponding to
the median of their prior distribution. The figure shows that, indeed, very few students
(8 percent) in our sample would receive good news about their performance relative
to their prior expectations. The presence of students who would receive good news
is concentrated in the highest segments of the test score distribution, confirming that
beliefs are, on average, more accurate among better-performing students.
3 Experimental Evidence on Belief Updating
3.1 Empirical Framework
The random assignment of individualized feedback across the students in our sample
allows us to measure the impact of the signal on posterior beliefs. Only if we show that
the signal is salient and effectively alters beliefs, we can move onwards to examine the
specific updating patterns that the sample exhibits. To track the relative importance
of the signal vis-a-vis that of priors, we require two contemporaneous measures of
beliefs for students in the treatment and in the control group, both before and after
the delivery of the performance feedback. We make use of the posteriors measured at
follow-up (which are collected after the delivery of the performance feedback for the
treatment group) and the priors measured at baseline.
We estimate linear regressions of the following form:
d
′
vij = β0dvij + β1dvij × Tj + γ0I(zvij = v) + γ1I(zvij = v)× Tj + ηi + ij, (1)
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where d
′
vij and dvij denote the individual densities of the posterior and the prior dis-
tributions, respectively, for each discrete interval v = {1, 2, ...5} in the support of the
exam score. The indicator function I(zvij = v) takes the value of one if student i’s score
in the mock test lies within interval v and zero otherwise, while the variable Tj takes
the value of one for any school j randomly assigned to receive performance feedback
and zero otherwise. The term ηi captures individual-specific constant terms and ij is
the usual error term, which is two-way clustered at the individual and school level.
The parameters β0 and γ0 capture the relative effects of baseline priors and the
score, respectively, in the formation of the posteriors for students in the control group,
who do not receive the performance feedback. In particular, β0 measures the average
degree of persistence in beliefs between the two survey rounds while γ0 measures the
extent to which students can infer something about their performance in the admission
test by simply taking the mock test.
The parameters β1 and γ1 have a causal interpretation as they rely on the random
variation in the treatment assignment. Estimates of β1 and γ1 measure the differential
effects of baseline priors and the signal value, respectively, in the formation of posteri-
ors for students who receive performance feedback (treated group) when compared to
students who do not receive any feedback on their performance (control group). To the
extent that the score in the mock test conveys relevant information regarding individ-
ual performance in the actual admission test, we expect γ1 > 0. Insofar as students’
prior expectations appear quite inaccurate relative to their observed performance (see
Section 2.3), we also expect β1 < 0. One benchmark case is a situation of complete
pass-through of the signal (score in the test): γ0 + γ1 = 1, i.e., irrespectively of the
location of the prior densities, the delivery of the signal moves all the probability mass
of the posterior distribution to the interval where the signal is located.
More standard approaches tend to rely on specific moments (such as the mean)
in order to characterize individual belief distributions. Focusing on interval-level data
allows us to flexibly explore the relationship between priors and posteriors, as we
only impose linearity between the probability mass allocated to a given interval in
the support of the test score across survey rounds. For example, we allow for non-
linearities in the relationship between mean priors and mean posteriors. An underlying
assumption of this approach is that students can accurately assign densities to each
interval, ruling out uncertainty or mistakes in calculating the number of beans allocated
to each bin. To minimize mistakes, we carefully developed and implemented a protocol
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that included visual aids and practice examples that worked well in our sample (see
Section 2.2). Nevertheless, we did not elicit the level of uncertainty when answering the
survey questions on beliefs and hence cannot rule out its existence in the interval-level
data.6
3.2 Estimation Results
Table 3 reports the OLS estimates of the regression model (1). Column 1 shows that
in the absence of personalized feedback, priors account for roughly two-thirds when
forming posterior beliefs. At the same time, the estimated coefficient of the score shows
that, on average, the experience of taking the test on its own induces a very small effect
in the updating process. The lack of signal pass-through among students in the control
group reflects the fact that taking the mock test is indeed a very weak and/or noisy
signal. Students in the treatment group reduce the relative role of priors on posteriors
by more than half. On average, the performance feedback leads to reduced persistence
of priors on posterior beliefs, but signal pass-through is far from complete. The signal
induces a 17 percentage-point increase in the probability mass of the posterior belief
distribution associated with the interval of the score in the mock test. Significant
persistence of priors remains even after the provision of personalized feedback, with an
estimated coefficient of 0.28 (≈ 0.62− 0.34) for the treatment group.
Students may react differently depending on the value of the realized score in the
mock test. A possible asymmetry in the updating process along that dimension may
partly explain the presence of overconfidence in the baseline assessments of own skills
observed in our sample. The descriptive evidence discussed in Section 2.3 suggests
that higher-performing students have more accurate perceptions of their own skills
6Table A.2 in the Web Appendix presents the OLS estimates of a variant of the regression model
(1), which considers the mean and the standard deviation of beliefs about academic achievement as
alternative outcome variables. Assuming a uniform distribution within each interval of the score, mean
beliefs are constructed as the summation over intervals of the product of the mid-point of the bin and
the probability assigned by the student to that bin. The standard deviation of the distribution of
beliefs is the square root of the summation over intervals of the product of the square of the mid-point
of the bin and the probability assigned to the bin minus the square of mean beliefs. The estimates
reported in Column 1 of Table A.2 show that the score in the mock test is positively correlated with
the mean and negatively correlated with the dispersion of posterior beliefs. The performance feedback
reduces the dependence of mean posteriors on mean priors by 63% and induces a three-fold increase
in the weight attributed to the signal, which is qualitatively consistent with our preferred estimates
based on interval-level data (see Column 1 in Table 3). The estimates reported in Column 2 of
Table A.2 further document that the feedback has no pass-through in the dispersion of the posterior
distributions. However, it does reduce the dependence on priors by 20 percent.
12
(see Figures 1-3). As such, they may also process differently new and informative sig-
nals about their own test performance. Column 2 in Table 3 presents heterogeneous
updating estimates according to whether or not the score in the mock test is above or
below the sample median. The results show that the performance feedback triggers a
more pronounced response among high scorers in terms of signal pass-through. While
students with below-median scores increase the probability mass allocated to the inter-
val of the score by 14 percentage points, students with above-median scores experience
an additional 5 percentage points increase in the density allocated to this interval.
Column 3 in Table 3 focuses on the role of initial uncertainty about priors in up-
dating. In a Bayesian updating framework, noisier priors lead to greater pass-through
of the signal. As before, we classify students into two groups depending on whether
or not the individual standard deviation of beliefs at baseline is above or below the
sample median. The results do not support the presence of differential effects of the
performance feedback on posteriors by the level of initial uncertainty in beliefs.
Table 4 further explores heterogenous effects in updating based on students’ socio-
demographic characteristics. First and foremost, Column 1 tests for any gender dif-
ferences in signal pass-through. Several studies show that males tend to be more
overconfident than females [Barber and Odean, 2001; Bordalo et al., 2019; Buser et al.,
2014]. We thus expect males to pay less attention to the performance feedback by
exhibiting lower signal pass-through into the posterior distribution. The results from
our sample do not find empirical support for any such effect. Both signal pass-through
and prior pass-through are indistinguishable between male and female students.
In Column 2 we perform the same test across sub-samples of students with low
and high socioeconomic status (SES), as measured by an asset index that is the first
factor of a principal component analysis on households’ ownership of a large set of
durable goods.7 Previous empirical evidence on updating along that specific dimension
is scant, and ex ante predictions are unclear. On one hand, wealthier families are likely
to provide greater support to their children in preparation for the admission exam. If
this were the case, we would expect prior beliefs to be closer to true ability for higher-
SES students and, consequently, we should observe a lower pass-through of the score
in the mock test. On the other hand, higher-SES students could be more responsive
to the score in the test simply because they are more effective at interpreting and
7The goods included in the principal component analysis are: telephone, television, washing ma-
chine, refrigerator, microwave oven, internet, cable television, tablet, computer, automobile, and water
and sewage connection.
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processing information about their own academic skills. The estimation results do not
find support for differences in the pass-through of feedback provision by SES. However,
we find that higher-SES students who are exposed to the performance feedback tend
to rely less on priors in forming their posteriors when compared to their lower-SES
counterparts.8
We finally check if access to specific resources for the preparation of the admission
exam, in the form of previous exposure to other mock tests, may at least partly explain
the observed heterogeneous responses by SES in terms of prior pass-through.9 Column
3 in Table 4 shows that the performance feedback has no differential impact on the
formation of posteriors among students with previous exposure to other mock tests
when compared to students with no prior test exposure. Hence, differential exposure
to comparable signals does not seem to be the main channel through which SES plays
a role in the updating patterns uncovered in Column 2 of Table 4.
All in all, the results in this Section confirm that the performance feedback con-
stitutes a rather informative signal about performance in the admission exam as it
led to significant changes in the weights attached to the priors and the signal itself
in the process of belief updating. However, signal pass-through is quite limited and
significant persistence of priors remains even after providing personalized performance
feedback. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that signal pass-through does not seem to
vary systematically by gender, SES, or initial uncertainty about priors, and it modestly
increases among students with higher scores in the mock test.
Even though signal pass-through seems to be homogeneous by SES, students who
are relatively better-off in terms of parental backgrounds seem to process more effec-
tively the information contained in the score of the mock test. Exposure to performance
feedback has a stronger negative effect on the persistence of prior beliefs among higher-
SES students. This suggests that, despite a similar perception of signal strength across
sub-groups, higher-SES students differentially incorporate the content of the signal
in shaping their posterior beliefs. This last piece of evidence hints towards potential
heterogenous updating processes by sub-groups. In the next Section, we explore this
avenue under a more flexible updating model that allows us to better characterize the
8Figure A.1 in the Web Appendix shows that the distributions of both overall and math perfor-
mance in the test do not differ systematically by students’ SES. This evidence is difficult to reconcile
with the view that higher SES students are also more able and hence they update more sophisticatedly.
9Higher-SES students are more likely to have benefited from previous mock exam experiences:
while only 22% of the students from lower-SES have previously taken a mock exam, over a third of
the students in the higher-SES group have done so.
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transition from priors to posteriors along the distribution of the realized score in the
mock test.
4 A Model of Belief Updating
4.1 Empirical Framework
Let pii(s) denote the prior probability assigned by student i to a test score in interval
s, where s ∈ {1, ...S}. Students take the mock test and are provided with their score
zi as a signal of their performance in the admission test. Signals and priors have the
same support and hence the former can be discretized to mimic the intervals of the
latter so that z ∈ {1, ..., Z}. By Bayes rule, we can compute the posterior belief of
what the student will get on the admission exam after observing the score on the mock
exam:
pii(s|z) = f(z|s)pii(s)∑S
s′=1 f(z|s′)pii(s′)
, (2)
where f(z|s) denote the conditional probability that a student who expects to get a
score in interval s in the admission test will score in interval z in the mock test.10 For
each realization of signal z the model yields one f(z|s) in each interval s of the support
of the test score, which fully characterize the process of belief updating. For instance, if
f(z|s) = 1
S
for a given z, the signal is non-informative and does not generate any impact
on posteriors – i.e., pii(s|z) = pii(s) ∀s ∈ {1, ...S}. In turn, if the signal is perfectly
informative about performance in the admission test, then students believe that their
score in the admission test will fall in the interval of the realized score in the mock test
with probability one – i.e., pii(s|z) = I(s = z), or complete signal pass-through.
Assuming that students have homogeneous expectations of the realization of the
score in the mock test within each interval s, we can parameterize the conditional
probability with a logit specification:
10The fact that the mock test occurs before the actual admission exam does not compromise the
definition of the f(z|s) as well-defined hypothetical conditional probabilities.
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f(z|s; θ) = e
θsz
1 +
∑Z
z′=2 e
θsz′
, (3)
where
∑
z f(z|s; θ) = 1 ∀s ∈ {1, ...S} after imposing θs1 = 0 as an arbitrary identifi-
cation normalization. The S×Z matrix of parameters Θ can be consistently estimated
by applying a Non-Linear Least Squares (NLS) estimator on equation (2) using the
observed priors pii(s) and posteriors pii(s|z) elicited in our survey. Since performance
feedback is only provided to the treated group, we focus on the longitudinal variation
in the individual belief distributions of treated students elicited during the follow-up
survey, both before and after the provision of the signal. Conditional on receiving
signal z, each estimated f(z|s) represents the relative weight of the probability mass
allocated to interval s in the prior distribution when constructing the posterior dis-
tribution. Thus, these probability weights provide an accurate characterization of the
degree of persistence of priors along the ability distribution.
The estimation procedure can easily be extended by further conditioning equations
(2) and (3) on observed student types, which can be characterized by the realizations
of one or more discrete covariates observed in our dataset such as gender and SES.
4.2 Estimation Results
Figure 4 displays the values of the estimated conditional probabilities depicted in equa-
tion (3). Table 5 reports the same coefficients of Figure 4 along with the bootstrapped
standard errors. Three broad patterns emerge. First, it is confirmed that the per-
formance feedback provides an informative signal, as students systematically shift the
weight in their initial priors towards the value of the signal. There is substantial prob-
ability mass assigned to the other intervals, though, which is qualitatively consistent
with the evidence of incomplete signal pass-through reported in Section 3.2 (see Table
3).
Second, there is some evidence of asymmetric updating along the distribution of
test scores. Although most students allocate the highest weight to priors in the same
interval of the signal, this pattern does not hold for students who score in the lowest
interval (0-40), where the corresponding weight is smaller compared to those assigned
to the second or third interval. This is particularly worrisome as priors are already
biased upwards among these students, who allocate very low average density to this
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interval to begin with (see Figure 1). Accordingly, we only observe a monotonic decline
in the estimated conditional probabilities around the interval in which the signal lands
when its value corresponds to the second and third intervals. This evidence may help
explain the substantial degree of overconfidence observed in prior beliefs, particularly
among lower-performing students (see Figure 3).
Third, students who get signals in the highest interval (85-128) are somehow “pru-
dent” in the extent of their update. While they do allocate a large probability mass
to the highest interval of the prior distribution, they also disproportionately assign a
relatively high weight to the lowest interval. In fact, the second interval also receives a
larger weight when compared to the one allocated to the middle interval. The resulting
U-shaped pattern in the updating process for high-performing students moderates the
potential shift to the right in the distribution of posteriors. Notice that the average
density allocated to these intervals among the highest scorers is quite limited (see Fig-
ure 1), and hence the estimated spikes in the transition weights for the lowest and
highest interval of the score have a limited impact in shaping posterior beliefs.
In order to better understand these updating patterns, we re-estimate the model (2)-
(3) by sub-groups of students defined by socio-demographic characteristics. We start
by splitting the sample by gender. The evidence discussed in Section 3.2 (see column
2 in Table 4) may hide some heterogeneous transition patterns for different values of
the signal that the analysis in this section should be able to uncover. Indeed, Figure
5 and Table 6 show that, unlike female students, male students tend to systematically
assign the largest weight to priors in the same interval of the signal, and the decline
in the estimated weights of the neighboring intervals is monotonic. In addition, male
students who receive a score in the highest interval seem to display a less pronounced
U-shaped pattern in the updating process when compared to their female counterparts.
All in all, we uncover some stark differences in the updating patterns by gender, with
male students being relatively more accurate than females in interpreting the ability
signal. Females seem to have more persistent priors, which diffuse the effect of signal
provision on posteriors. The Wald test based on the difference between the estimated
conditional probabilities across the male and female sub-samples strongly rejects the
hypothesis of equal parameters (χ2=53.63, p-value=0.0001).
Figure 6 and Table 7 report the estimated conditional probabilities by SES. Consis-
tently with the results discussed in Section 3.2, high-SES students seem to internalize
more the ability signal provided through the performance feedback. They systemat-
17
ically assign the largest share of the probability mass to priors in the same interval
of the signal. The relative weight assigned to higher-valued priors tends to monotoni-
cally increase with the value of the signal received. The updating process for the best
performing students in the high-SES group is not U-shaped, as a very small weight is
allocated to the lowest interval of the priors. In turn, the results suggest that updat-
ing behavior among low-SES individuals is much more erratic. These students tend
to discard the information derived from signals in the lowest interval, as the weights
allocated to their priors are more or less uniform across intervals. They also seem to
extract relatively less information from higher-valued signals. Among those who get
the highest score, the estimated weight allocated to the first interval is very large and
close in magnitude to the one corresponding to the highest-valued interval. The Wald
test rejects the hypothesis of equal parameters across the two sub-samples defined by
SES (χ2=36.94, p-value=0.012).
All in all, the model estimates presented here reveal markedly heterogeneous up-
dating patterns that could not be detected under the empirical framework discussed
in Section 3. The additional structure imposed by the updating framework and the
functional form assumptions allow us to accurately estimate the degree of priors’ per-
sistence in the formation of posterior beliefs, conditional on receiving feedback and the
value of the signal itself. We uncover interesting differences by gender and SES that
suggest that females and lower-SES students may not fully incorporate an informative
signal due to the relatively higher persistence of prior beliefs.
5 Conclusion
We use a large-scale field experiment to study belief updating in a setting where beliefs
are tightly linked to high-stakes choices and outcomes. We repeatedly elicit proba-
bilistic statements about performance expectations in an achievement test using bean
counts over a discretized support. Such a task appears a priori challenging, yet our ap-
proach turns out to be intuitive and accessible for the age group that the intervention
targets. We complement the resulting longitudinal measures of subjective beliefs with
randomized exposure to performance feedback on an achievement test.
The data show that prior beliefs about academic achievement of the ninth-grade
students in our sample are relatively inaccurate when compared to an actual achieve-
ment measure, especially for those who do not perform very well therein. Providing
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individualized feedback on academic performance tilts the individual posterior distri-
butions toward the realization of the signal and reduces the relative role of the priors
in the updating process, but signal pass-through is far from complete. A second set
of results based on a simple model of updating behavior confirms that the feedback
provided with the experiment induces changes in the probabilistic weights allocated to
each interval of the prior densities, but the persistence of priors on posteriors plays a
predominant role.
Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that male and high-SES individuals are rel-
atively more effective at processing an informative signal about their own academic
skills. The result on gender may shed light on previous findings from the experimen-
tal literature on gender differences in overconfidence [Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007;
Reuben et al., 2015]. The U-shaped updating pattern found among high-performing
female students moderates the potential shift to the right in posteriors when compared
to male students (see Figure 6), thereby providing a channel through which the mean
level of overconfidence is larger for men than for women.
To the best of our knowledge, the heterogeneous updating patterns found between
high-SES students and low-SES students is novel and potentially relevant for the de-
sign of policy interventions aimed at disseminating information on individual academic
skills. The strong persistence of prior beliefs and the rather erratic updating behavior
among low-SES individuals point toward the possible limitations of simple and cost-
effective ways of delivering information to this sub-population of students. Effectively
undoing biases in subjective beliefs and realigning educational aspirations among disad-
vantaged students may require contemplating policy tools that provide more in-depth
feedback such as tutoring and career counseling (see, e.g., Carlana et al. [2017]).
One broader lesson from our findings is that characterizing movements in the entire
belief distribution, rather than some of its moments, may reveal some nuanced patterns
in updating behaviors that are key to understand how individuals process and internal-
ize new information. Our analysis also features some limitations, as it relies on a very
short panel of individual observations (albeit with a large cross-sectional dimension)
and one controlled information shock to study the dynamics of individual beliefs. The
elicitation of beliefs over a discretized support pursued here may be portable to longer
panel datasets, which potentially feature multiple spells of exposure to information
shocks.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Distribution of Prior Beliefs Conditional on the Score in the Mock Test
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85−128
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0−40
0−40 40−55 55−70 70−85 85−128
Note: For all students scoring in a given interval of the distribution of the mock test (vertical axis),
the figure reports the average density allocated to each interval in the baseline survey (horizontal
axis).
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Figure 2: Share of Students Allocating Positive Probability Mass to Each Interval
Conditional on the Score in the Mock Test
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Note: For all students scoring in a given interval of the distribution of the mock test (horizontal
axis), the figure reports the share of students allocating at least one bean (1/20 of probability mass)
to each interval in the support of the belief distribution at baseline.
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Figure 3: Empirical Density of the Score in the Mock Test by Good/Bad News
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Note: “Good news” is defined as to whether or not the individual scores in the mock exam lie in an
interval that is above the one corresponding to the median of the baseline belief distributions.
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Figure 4: Estimated Conditional Probabilities f(z|s)
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Note: For different discrete values of the score in the mock test (signal) z, each bar in the figure
reports the conditional probability f(z|s), as defined in equations (2)-(3), estimated by NLS using
the downhill simplex (Nelder-Mead) algorithm to minimize the sum of the square of the differences
between the LHS and the RHS of equation (2). Sample of ninth graders in schools that belong to
the treatment group. See Table 5 for the full set of estimates along with the bootstrapped standard
errors.
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Figure 5: Estimated Conditional Probabilities f(z|s) by Gender
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(a) Male
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(b) Female
Note: For different discrete values of the score in the mock test (signal) z and gender sub-group, each
bar in the figure reports the conditional probability f(z|s), as defined in equations (2)-(3), estimated
by NLS using the downhill simplex (Nelder-Mead) algorithm to minimize the sum of the square of the
differences between the LHS and the RHS of equation (2). Sample of ninth graders in schools that
belong to the treatment group. See Table 6 for the full set of estimates along with the bootstrapped
standard errors. 24
Figure 6: Estimated Conditional Probabilities f(z|s) by SES
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(a) Low SES
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Note: For different discrete values of the score in the mock test (signal) z and SES sub-group, each
bar in the figure reports the conditional probability f(z|s), as defined in equations (2)-(3), estimated
by NLS using the downhill simplex (Nelder-Mead) algorithm to minimize the sum of the square of the
differences between the LHS and the RHS of equation (2). Sample of ninth graders in schools that
belong to the treatment group. See Table 7 for the full set of estimates along with the bootstrapped
standard errors. 25
Table 1: Applicants’ Characteristics
Sample All Applicants Experiment Adj. Mean Difference
Statistic Mean SD Mean SD P-value
Works 0.273 0.446 0.315 0.465 0.152
Indigenous student 0.041 0.199 0.098 0.297 0.001
Disabled student 0.113 0.317 0.141 0.348 0.159
Scholarship in Middle School 0.112 0.315 0.108 0.310 0.881
Grade retention in Middle School 0.134 0.340 0.142 0.349 0.316
GPA (middle school) 8.130 0.894 8.147 0.843 0.477
Lives with both parents 0.746 0.436 0.789 0.408 0.000
Mother with college degree 0.117 0.321 0.053 0.224 0.004
Asset-based SES index -0.040 1.904 0.012 1.836 0.000
Exam score in COMIPEMS 70.99 21.17 64.91 19.78 0.000
Took preparatory courses 0.536 0.499 0.508 0.500 0.358
Guidance through application 0.977 0.151 0.977 0.149 0.257
Plans to go to college 0.808 0.394 0.724 0.447 0.001
Does not give up 0.882 0.323 0.879 0.326 0.445
Tries his/her best 0.760 0.427 0.720 0.449 0.259
Finishes what he/she starts 0.756 0.430 0.713 0.452 0.079
Works hard 0.766 0.423 0.723 0.448 0.101
Number of observations 203,121 2,293 205,414
Note: The ’Mexico City’ sample consists of all applicants in the centralized assignment in the year
2014 from the Mexico City metropolitan area who were assigned through the matching algorithm. The
’Experiment’ sample consists of the sample of students selected from the population above according
to the criteria specified in Section 2.1. The P-values reported in the last column refer to the adjusted
differences in means between the two samples after controlling for municipality fixed effects.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Randomization Check
Control Treated Treated-Control
(1) (2) (3)
Administrative Data:
Exam score 64.931 64.883 0.235
(19.647) (19.926) [1.168]
GPA in Middle School 8.138 8.157 -0.003
(0.851) (0.834) [0.050]
Scholarship in Middle School 0.103 0.113 0.007
(0.304) (0.316) [0.015]
Grade retention in Middle School 0.148 0.136 -0.005
(0.356) (0.342) [0.021]
Does not skip classes 0.965 0.975 0.011
(0.183) (0.157) [0.010]
Plans to go to college 0.729 0.718 -0.014
(0.445) (0.450) [0.021]
Disabled student 0.139 0.142 0.001
(0.346) (0.350) [0.017]
Indigenous student 0.094 0.101 0.011
(0.292) (0.302) [0.015]
Lives with both parents 0.784 0.795 0.010
(0.412) (0.404) [0.018]
Works 0.324 0.306 -0.021
(0.468) (0.461) [0.021]
Mother with college degree 0.052 0.055 0.002
(0.222) (0.227) [0.011]
Father with college degree 0.092 0.098 0.007
(0.290) (0.298) [0.015]
High SES (asset index) 0.484 0.518 0.024
(0.500) (0.500) [0.025]
Number of Observations 1192 1101 2293
Survey Data:
Mock exam score 58.772 60.752 1.654
(15.618) (16.403) [1.075]
Mean Beliefs at Baseline 74.388 74.449 0.015
(14.422) (14.404) [0.955]
SD Beliefs at Baseline 18.056 17.624 -0.526
(8.287) (8.328) [0.455]
Previous mock exam with feedback 0.139 0.174 0.030
(0.346) (0.379) [0.036]
Male 0.469 0.497 0.024
(0.499) (0.500) [0.017]
Number of Observations 1318 1226 2544
Note: Columns 1 and 2 report means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Column 3 displays
the OLS coefficients of the treatment assignment indicator and the standard errors (in brackets),
which are clustered at the middle school level.
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Table 3: Belief Updating
Dependent Variable: Density of Posterior in Each Interval
(1) (2) (3)
Density of Prior 0.621*** 0.487*** 0.609***
[0.032] [0.033] [0.034]
Signal 0.010* -0.028*** 0.013
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009]
Density of Prior × Feedback -0.342*** -0.363*** -0.333***
[0.042] [0.052] [0.045]
Signal × Feedback 0.169*** 0.142*** 0.183***
[0.015] [0.020] [0.021]
Density of Prior × [Signal > Median] 0.228***
[0.043]
Density of Prior × Feedback × [Signal > Median] 0.001
[0.058]
Signal × [Signal > Median] 0.061***
[0.012]
Signal × Feedback × [Signal > Median] 0.046**
[0.022]
Density of Prior × High Uncertainty 0.064*
[0.037]
Density of Prior × Feedback × High Uncertainty -0.047
[0.049]
Signal × High Uncertainty -0.005
[0.010]
Signal × Feedback × High Uncertainty -0.028
[0.022]
Number of Observations 12720 12720 12720
Number of Schools 90 90 90
Number of Students 2544 2544 2544
R-squared 0.275 0.293 0.276
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates with student fixed
effects using interval-level data. Standard errors clustered at the school and student-level are reported
in brackets.
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Table 4: Belief Updating by Individual Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Density of Posterior in Each Interval
(1) (2) (3)
Density of Prior 0.611*** 0.580*** 0.574***
[0.037] [0.041] [0.032]
Density of Prior × Feedback -0.344*** -0.297*** -0.321***
[0.047] [0.051] [0.045]
Signal 0.007 0.002 0.014**
[0.008] [0.010] [0.007]
Signal × Feedback 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.163***
[0.017] [0.022] [0.018]
Density of Prior × Male 0.022
[0.040]
Density of Prior × Feedback × Male 0.004
[0.058]
Signal × Male 0.008
[0.013]
Signal × Feedback × Male -0.006
[0.022]
Density of Prior × High SES 0.131***
[0.039]
Density of Prior × Feedback × High SES -0.123**
[0.055]
Signal × High SES 0.009
[0.012]
Signal × Feedback × High SES -0.009
[0.025]
Density of Prior × Previous Mock 0.163***
[0.039]
Density of Prior × Feedback × Previous Mock -0.070
[0.057]
Signal × Previous Mock -0.016
[0.013]
Signal × Feedback × Previous Mock 0.029
[0.030]
Number of Observations 12720 9895 12720
Number of Schools 90 90 90
Number of Students 2544 1979 2544
R-squared 0.276 0.300 0.279
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS estimates with student
fixed effects using interval-level data. Standard errors clustered at the school and student-level are
reported in brackets. The difference in the number of students and, in turn, in the number of
observations in Column 2 with respect to the other Columns is due to missing values in the SES
index, which are unrelated to the exposure to Performance Feedback (see Table A.1 in the Appendix).
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Table 5: Estimated Conditional Probabilities f(z|s)
Signal (z)
Prior (pii(s)) 0-40 40-55 55-70 70-85 85-128
0-40 0.153 0.201 0.062 0.115 0.469
(0.069) (0.086) (0.059) (0.099) (0.146)
40-55 0.215 0.346 0.148 0.059 0.233
(0.057) (0.114) (0.073) (0.060) (0.101)
55-70 0.181 0.320 0.219 0.136 0.145
(0.032) (0.093) (0.102) (0.055) (0.079)
70-85 0.144 0.177 0.155 0.223 0.301
(0.035) (0.050) (0.076) (0.090) (0.085)
85-128 0.088 0.135 0.071 0.147 0.560
(0.051) (0.042) (0.040) (0.084) (0.113)
Note: NLS estimates using the downhill simplex (Nelder-Mead) al-
gorithm to minimize the sum of the square of the differences between
the LHS and the RHS of equation (2). Standard errors calculated
with 50 bootstrap replications are reported in parentheses. Sample
of ninth graders in schools that belong to the treatment group. Pri-
ors are measured at follow up, before signal delivery. Posteriors are
measured at follow up, after the delivery of the signal.
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Table 6: Estimated Conditional Probabilities f(z|s), by Gen-
der
(a) Sample: Males
Signal (z)
Prior (pii(s)) 0-40 40-55 55-70 70-85 85-128
0-40 0.196 0.529 0.040 0.045 0.191
(0.063) (0.138) (0.047) (0.137) (0.181)
40-55 0.184 0.582 0.080 0.041 0.113
(0.049) (0.182) (0.058) (0.091) (0.134)
55-70 0.164 0.504 0.150 0.082 0.098
(0.042) (0.109) (0.089) (0.096) (0.078)
70-85 0.140 0.331 0.114 0.104 0.311
(0.042) (0.086) (0.077) (0.117) (0.090)
85-128 0.062 0.269 0.049 0.078 0.542
(0.047) (0.073) (0.039) (0.130) (0.122)
(b) Sample: Females
Signal (z)
Prior (pii(s)) 0-40 40-55 55-70 70-85 85-128
0-40 0.168 0.171 0.119 0.203 0.339
(0.084) (0.087) (0.077) (0.141) (0.150)
40-55 0.297 0.248 0.198 0.140 0.117
(0.067) (0.106) (0.100) (0.103) (0.090)
55-70 0.148 0.245 0.274 0.139 0.194
(0.049) (0.105) (0.148) (0.087) (0.081)
70-85 0.155 0.135 0.157 0.218 0.335
(0.048) (0.063) (0.093) (0.124) (0.098)
85-128 0.155 0.100 0.074 0.148 0.522
(0.056) (0.063) (0.053) (0.137) (0.146)
Note: NLS estimates using the downhill simplex (Nelder-Mead) al-
gorithm to minimize the sum of the square of the differences between
the LHS and the RHS of equation (2). Standard errors calculated
with 50 bootstrap replications are reported in parentheses. Sample
of ninth graders in schools that belong to the treatment group. Pri-
ors are measured at follow up, before signal delivery. Posteriors are
measured at follow up, after the delivery of the signal.
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Table 7: Estimated Conditional Probabilities f(z|s), by SES
(a) Sample: Low SES
Signal (z)
Prior (pii(s)) 0-40 40-55 55-70 70-85 85-128
0-40 0.179 0.150 0.182 0.057 0.432
(0.063) (0.083) (0.050) (0.142) (0.171)
40-55 0.174 0.255 0.266 0.100 0.205
(0.060) (0.126) (0.063) (0.106) (0.096)
55-70 0.156 0.171 0.462 0.120 0.091
(0.043) (0.089) (0.099) (0.107) (0.092)
70-85 0.186 0.093 0.335 0.133 0.253
(0.041) (0.057) (0.073) (0.136) (0.108)
85-128 0.196 0.058 0.177 0.108 0.461
(0.055) (0.043) (0.043) (0.174) (0.152)
(b) Sample: High SES
Signal (z)
Prior (pii(s)) 0-40 40-55 55-70 70-85 85-128
0-40 0.390 0.134 0.161 0.120 0.195
(0.078) (0.135) (0.066) (0.160) (0.179)
40-55 0.274 0.172 0.204 0.094 0.256
(0.061) (0.117) (0.069) (0.103) (0.123)
55-70 0.228 0.163 0.273 0.165 0.171
(0.047) (0.111) (0.081) (0.101) (0.107)
70-85 0.075 0.087 0.177 0.243 0.417
(0.046) (0.081) (0.053) (0.134) (0.120)
85-128 0.112 0.056 0.085 0.177 0.570
(0.064) (0.092) (0.031) (0.140) (0.141)
Note: NLS estimates using the downhill simplex (Nelder-Mead) al-
gorithm to minimize the sum of the square of the differences between
the LHS and the RHS of equation (2). Standard errors calculated
with 50 bootstrap replications are reported in parentheses. Sample
of ninth graders in schools that belong to the treatment group. Pri-
ors are measured at follow up, before signal delivery. Posteriors are
measured at follow up, after the delivery of the signal.
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